Abstract
Overview
The introductory section of this paper provides an overview of the argument elaborated in the remainder of the paper. Proceeding from the question about the extent to which research of any kind, including phenomenology in any of its various forms, can be presuppositionless, it questions the claim that transcendental phenomenology has the ability to overcome the "vicious circle" which Husserl (1911 Husserl ( / 1981a contended made it impossible for natural science, with its empirically relativistic assumption that only experimentalism enables the truth about any matter to emerge, to contribute to grounding itself.
Husserl's phenomenology was essentially theoretical and originally conceived both to locate philosophy as a "rigorous science" and to overcome the problems of an excessive zeal for empiricism (1911/1981a) . Between the years 1925 to 1929 at least, Husserl was clear that there were two versions of phenomenology. Both were "a priori", theoretical or philosophical clarifications of experience. Phenomenological pure psychology is a way of understanding how consciousness works in its social context to create meaning. Taking the world and people in it to be real, it defines how mental processes work together to produce specific types of meaning.
Transcendental phenomenology, on the other hand, is a more abstract version of exploring meaning for any consciousness in any social context. For Husserl, it is not necessarily tied to the limitation of understanding this world (Husserl, 1931 (Husserl, /1977a (Husserl, , 1962 (Husserl, /1977b (Husserl, /1997a (Husserl, /1997b . The original forms of phenomenology were theoretical endeavours in the way that pure mathematics supports the applied sciences. While a pure psychology supports all real world science and academia, transcendental phenomenology supports philosophy. Both of Husserl's studies are theory-building for later empiricism through understanding consciousness. Whether in its real world psychological form or the transcendental study of meaning in a public world, the phenomenology of the intentionality of consciousness aims to determine the invariant structure of conscious experience (1973/1999) .
For Husserl, the dream was never over that transcendental phenomenology and its practitioners or "non-participating onlookers" can conclude on consciousness and how it works (1956/1970, pp. 391-394 ). Husserl's methods involve working on the raw data of the many co-occurring types of conscious experiences, in order to conclude on the nature of the forms of intentionality that are creative of them (Marbach, 1992 (Marbach, , 1993 (Marbach, , 2005 . The implication is that all of life occurs through various types of awareness about objects that produce different senses of them that can be grasped in various contexts -irrespective of whether those contexts are interpretive ones of understanding, or whether they be perceptual or psychological contexts. Proper explanation in practice and theory concerns making explicit in terms of intentionalities how, for instance, a memory experientially co-occurs in the perceptual present. Husserl asserted that his phenomenology would ground the sciences through mental clarification of the nature of the intentionalities in relation to various aspects of attention. This is the key to making empirical applications of ideas hit their target. For instance, it was Darwin who observed animals and then theorised about heritability and selection. It takes contemporary DNA research to prove him right or wrong. It was Einstein who imagined what it was like to travel at the speed of light in order to make his mathematical statements. It took twentieth century physics to explore his claims.
However, Jaspers, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur did not agree with the claim that transcendental phenomenology could overthrow the hermeneutic circle between "the aim-providing problems as of its methods", given the existence even in phenomenology of "a certain logical harmony between the guiding problems ... and precisely such foundations and methods" (Husserl, 1911 (Husserl, /1981a . This can be read precisely as a warning to deal with the blindspot of the circular influence of previous understanding. In agreement with these writers, this paper argues that any inquiry or science is inevitably hermeneutic in the sense that it makes sense and should be self-reflexive in understanding what it takes to its subject matter. It urges contemporary workers in empirical phenomenology and psychology to take heed of what the hermeneutic circle means: there are no unprejudiced views. Prior views influence, and maybe even create, what is found by means of their modes of attention to the object of study. If the proposition of the hermeneutic circle is accepted, what is implied is that it is impossible to eradicate the influence of the past on present understanding. This is particularly problematic when it comes to making conclusions in empirical phenomenology, qualitative or quantitative psychology, and other types of empirical research.
In order to show that these claims are justified, it is necessary to side-step some entrenched misunderstandings about phenomenology. Here no criticism is made of empirical phenomenology following the influence of Gurwitsch, Cairns, Giorgi, Wertz, Embree and others. However, the thrust of all of these can be classified as object-oriented empirical phenomenology. An exclusive focus on the sense of objects was never Husserl's project in his exploring of links between the forms of intentionality, the senses obtained about specific objects of attention, and understanding how these exist in contexts or horizons (Husserl, 1913 (Husserl, /1982 1980 Marbach, 1992) . Consequently, therefore, phenomenology was never merely the description of the senses of objects as an end in itself. For Husserl, the primary focus on intentionality was impeded because "the phenomenological method ... only leads us first into a new naïveté, that of simple descriptive act analysis" that he sometimes called "noetic phenomenology", "noetics", "intentional analysis", "intentional psychology", "elucidation" or "explication", Auslegung (stated by Husserl in August 1931 : Cairns, 1976 . The original phenomenology is the elucidation of connections between intentionalities, senses, objects and contexts, as was indicated by Husserl's remarks about making "an uncovering ... an explication ... of what is consciously meant (the objective sense) and correlatively, an explication of the potential intentional processes themselves" (Husserl, 1931 . For this paper, it is precisely this movement from what appears, "the objective sense", to the conclusions concerning what is 'invisible', the "intentional processes themselves", that demands a specific type of hermeneutics of how to make such interpretative conclusions. To spell this out once more: what Husserl claimed was that the applied sciences should understand how consciousness works in conceptmaking and arguing in relation to the conscious
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University's Faculty of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium without the express permission of the publishers.
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org.
experiences that occur in their social contexts, in order to justify their claims (1962/1977, §45) . Husserlian conclusions are of the sort reported by Marbach (1993 Marbach ( , 2005 . They concern how all simple and compound types of mental acts exist and connect, one with the others.
The hermeneutic circle is particularly pertinent to Husserlian phenomenology. Because intentionalities do not appear, not even to first-person conscious experience, they can only ever be interpreted. The end-products of the senses of objects appear, but that is the result of the work done by one consciousness in connection with other consciousnesses. (Husserl, 1913 (Husserl, /1982 . The modes of givenness -as spoken about, remembered, heard -are compared and contrasted to interpret concepts that define precisely how a memory reappears in current perception, for instance, or in order to understand how looking at a painting differs from reading the written word. The aim is to understand how intentionality enables these things to make their publicly-accessible meanings. A more complex example in psychology is when participants fill in a questionnaire, where it is the totality of their previous understanding that enables them to rate themselves and provide answers to the questions. It is also the totality of prior experience that enables the questionnaire to make sense and provides for psychologists then to allocate numerical scores to the answers supplied.
The most general case of the problem of the hermeneutic circle for science and academic inquiry is that the current object is understood on the basis of the old, to such a degree that past learning can obscure the current object. The hermeneutic circle is the "to-and-fro movement ... between interpreting individual phenomena and interpreting the whole"
that "is characteristic of all interpretation" (Rickman, 2004, p. 73) . In general, the phenomenon of understanding includes what could be called bias, prejudice or inability to attend to the current object.
The upshot for qualitative psychology, for instance, is a failure to grasp the phenomena of its participants as they experience them, because pre-existing theory mis-directs the researchers away from the phenomena. For qualitative psychology, a psychological hermeneutics would be a formal study of the role of previous understanding that is taken to the current phenomena, in such a way as to create findings in the light of previous understanding. This is observable in psychology, where each school has its own viewpoint that serves as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Dilthey of 5 July, 1911 /1981b , it is not clear how he overcame the circularity within his own practice and theory. Husserl also stated the following in one sentence which is the opposite of what
Heidegger contended: "All experiential knowledge of life is restricted by the particular respective lifepractice, which predelineates how far the determinacies are to be determined in advance; theoretical interest and science are practically uninterested and thereby unlimitedly all-inclusive in their focus" (1962/1977, §45, p. 172 ). Husserl's object was to understand consciousness generally, and his method involved elucidating his own consciousness and imagining the experiences of other persons , cited in Marbach, 1982 . His methods conclude on theory about the nature of consciousness by thought experiments on the universal nature of consciousness (Husserl, 1913 (Husserl, /1982 /1997a /1997b 1931 . There are major problems in using a technique of imaginative variation to conclude on theory. The limits of consciousness, hermeneutics and life experience are constraints:
1. There is the inability to have the experiences and perspectives of others as they have them.
2. There is great difficulty in remembering one's own childhood or understanding the experiences of infants (as per 1).
3. The ability to imagine another's experiences is limited according to the breadth of one's own social and cultural experiences.
4. There is difficulty knowing what sort of human experience to include and hence how to capture the whole of a region in relation to its greater wholes. Relevant in this regard is the fact that Husserl classed phenomenology as a theory-making procedure and not as an empirical one.
Very pertinently for Husserlian phenomenology, there is confusion between aims and methods, particularly when there is a claim to be presuppositionless. Husserl stated a laudable and self-reflexive ideal when he wrote that "The true method follows the nature of the things to be investigated and not our prejudices and preconceptions" (1911/1981a, p. 179) . But the problem is precisely -how it is possible to remove the influence of the past and invisible guiding assumptions, and occupy a position of no bias towards the meaningful phenomena of consciousness? This leaves an unanswered question in his work concerning the self-understanding of the transcendental phenomenologist or "non-participating onlooker" who "does not have to assert any realities and possibilities with respect to the actual and quasidata belonging to the Ego underneath. What he asserts in this respect are 'realities' and 'possibilities' in quotation marks" (1980/2005, text 20, p. 697, fn. 13) . What this last citation means is that the method of thought experiments about what is merely possible concerning any consciousness in any world was allegedly sufficient to reason about what is universal and what must be the case for all consciousness. To reiterate Husserl's claim, transcendental phenomenology takes the "'psychical', which appears in the natural attitude, and in positively oriented psychology, as a dependent stratum of being in humans and animals, [and] thereby loses even the sense of a mundanely phenomenal event" (Bernet, Kern & Marbach, 1993, p 74) . This is claiming that the transcendental reduction removes consciousness from the wrong interpretation of it as a part of the materialistic world, with all the mis-understandings of the natural or everyday understandings of common sense. He claimed that the transcendental reduction and other methods freed consciousness for unbiased inspection. It is not clear how this can be done through the imagination alone, and that is one reason why Husserl has had so many critics.
In line with hermeneutic phenomenology, this paper takes issue with Husserl and demands an encounter with hermeneutics. It is argued that, in order to conclude on the nature of the intentionalities, hermeneutics and phenomenology should sit together. Agreeing with hermeneutics means that it is impossible to have a school of 'no obstructions'. Paradoxically, to believe that one has attained no obstructions is to be blinded both to them and to the blindness of one's own bias. This is why Jaspers, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur disagreed with Husserl. As Merleau-Ponty put it: "The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (1945/1962, p. xiv) . To accept the role of hermeneutics is to agree that it is possible to create schools of research that are self-reflexive in understanding how they draw their conclusions. This is accounting for one's own
perspective in terms of how meaning and cause are concluded on, for instance. The role of hermeneutics is academic theoretical discourse oriented towards the aim of self-reflexivity.
Husserl's Positive Legacy
Now that the argument of this paper has been outlined in full, the purpose of the remainder of the paper is to provide more evidence for its key claims. The current section comments on certain aspects of Husserl's claims and considers the implications of some key passages from his writing. The following section notes how the phenomenological movement developed towards hermeneutics and meaning, away from the original claim to be presuppositionless and to have overcome the hermeneutic and other circles.
In the third section, in support of the link between phenomenology and hermeneutics, commonalities seen across a number of twentieth century hermeneutic phenomenologists are stated in relation to psychology. A short number of general conclusions are stated for the human sciences in the main, although they also apply to other areas.
It is well known that Husserl has had an influence in a number of academic areas. But no other persons have followed his methods and ideas to the letter in their development of his work. Not even the closest interpreters like Kern, Marbach, Ströker and Zahavi have published work that shows the details of the thought experiments that clarify the intentionalities. This omission implies criticism. Below, thumbnail sketches of a selection of twentieth century writers are provided in support of the assertion that phenomenology can only exist as a hermeneutic and explicitly self-reflexive approach. What this means is that a sufficient understanding needs to be taken to a phenomenon in order to reveal it properly. The opposite effect is also noticeable. Poor or downright wrong understanding can be applied -that obscures and mis-represents -so leading knowledge and practices away from their aims and objects.
Husserl set the scene for a more radical turn to experience than Kant by noting that belief is close to perception and other forms of the givenness of meanings of different sorts (1973/1999, p. 61; 1913/1982, §135, p. 325 (1931/1977, §61, p. 146) . This is "seeing" the evidence of spaciality, temporality and causality as they apply to the sense of self in connection with others: in that personal being concerns the sense of the lived body as the central point on which each self looks out onto the world.
For Husserl, reason is striving towards better evidence and moving away from lesser types (1913/ 1982, §138, pp. 332-333, §151, p. 364 (1929/1969, §105, p. 279) . Having laid out some of the key passages from Husserl, a few short remarks will be made about the intellectual heritage of hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics
This section sketches the overall nature of hermeneutics via some brief sketches of the early contributors. It was Friedrich Ast who seems to have been the first person to formulate the basic proposition that later became known as the hermeneutic circle (Palmer, 1969, p. 77 Martin Heidegger's approach became popular because he took Husserl's attention to lived experiences, and, in creating his "fundamental ontology", he indicated that the path for philosophy was to put its house in order by basing its claims about what exists or not on the most fundamental and all-encompassing direct experience of existence and non-existence (1927/1996, § §3-6). The significance of this is that each academic discipline sets its course by identifying a region of genuinely existing objects towards which it is devoted. The prior understanding is that a region and its objects genuinely exist in an implicit way, pre-reflexively ( §69b, p. 328), because of temporality ( §69c), in the sense that temporality is the most important aspect of being of human being in that the past, the present and the future co-exist. In Heidegger's terminology, once a fundamental ontology has been established, it would then be possible to ground regional ontologies (academic disciplines concerning parts of the world and regions of objects) on direct experience, properly interpreted "in the right way" ( §33, p. 143). By this he meant that there should be an a priori intellectual analysis of human being as temporal, in relation to its situatedness in terms of its contexts, practical action, its social habit, the role of language, its mortality, in relation to its conscience, in occupying physical space, and its other characteristics, including its ability to not know itself.
Husserl never acknowledged the relevance of hermeneutics in his published writing, although he did acknowledge a debt of inspiration to Dilthey. Husserl responded to Dilthey and replied to the hermeneutic tradition as a whole (1968/1981b, 1962/ 1977 , § §1, 2, 3d). Husserl worked to identify parts of the whole. He insisted that basic understanding is drawn through seeing evidence for oneself, a type of experiential learning. However, there is a great deal of meaning that is simply just not present as a fact. The problem with urging people to observe phenomena is that any group of reasonable people will see different meanings in what appears to them. This is why it is necessary to have some account of how meaning is co-created -particularly when the aim is to account for the conditions of the possibility of meaning for more than one person.
The background themes now being in place, the paper proceeds to provide some thumbnail sketches of five key thinkers who concluded either that hermeneutics and phenomenology co-exist or that meaning should be addressed in a holistic way.
The Hermeneutic Commonality within the History of Phenomenology
This section refers to those who critiqued Husserl and developed his ideas. The French readings of Husserl and Heidegger were mixed with other aspects of politics, philosophy, psycho-analysis and Gestalt psychology to produce the expanded view called existential phenomenology. Only a few comments will be made on the positive lead set by Heidegger in regard to uniting hermeneutics and phenomenology. Then some brief characterisations of Sartre and de Beauvoir are provided to show their attention to meaning.
Despite Heidegger's ironic introductory comments that philosophers should be guided by how things show themselves (1927/1996, §7c, p. 30) and that hermeneutics should be used to attend to non-verbal
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. (1975/1982, §2, p. 10) . What he was arguing for was a turn towards understanding human being through a "hermeneutic of the facticity of Dasein in general" (1927/1996, p. 401, n. 1) , by which he meant finding the enabling conditions for being in a world through argument concerning everyday experience: like using a hammer ( §33, p. 145), understanding road signs ( §17, p. 74), or understanding the weather to see if it will rain or not ( §17, p. 75).
However, let us turn to the case of understanding people. There is the shared attention to imagining the experiences of other persons in , cited in Marbach, 1982 and Karl Jaspers (1913 /1963 Wiggins and Schwartz, 1997) . Jaspers well understood the hermeneutic circle and exemplified it in his approach to psychopathology (1913/1963, pp. 355-359 Paul Ricoeur (1975) was another who argued for an attendance to conscious meanings and the need for formal ways of making sense of what appears. Ricoeur concluded that hermeneutics is necessary for phenomenology to exist. What this means is that the territory of meaning is a region for natural empirical science. For Ricoeur, phenomenology is the "indispensable presupposition" of hermeneutics (1975, p. 85) . He thus argued that both disciplines stand together. Ricoeur picked Husserl's definition of the explication of the link between intentionalities and their objects as the explication of these correlations in terms of interpreting the forms of intentionalities in play with respect to their objects (Husserl, 1931 ). Ricoeur focused on finding intentionality in phenomenology because hermeneutics is required for making distinctions between all the types of givenness: as remembered, as heard, as discussed in concepts. Therefore, phenomenology is hermeneutics (1975, p. 99) . The link between what Ricoeur pointed out and what Husserl originally wrote is that phenomenology comes into being when "we therefore ask quite universally ... what is evidentially 'inherent' in the whole reduced phenomenon ... its 'perceived as perceived '" (1913/1982, §90, p. 220) . The common aim is to interpret phenomena properly, according to their genuine manner of being, which is how the intentionalities and the senses produced overlap and intermingle (1962/1977, §3e, p. 26) . The problem to be overcome is that, if it is unclear how initial understanding obscures or represents the phenomena in question, then there is no account of how to conclude properly in any investigation about it.
The term "existentialism" sometimes refers to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre alone and sometimes to existential phenomenology as a whole: what I am calling the "French readings" of Husserl, Heidegger, psychoanalysis and Gestalt. What is concluded by Jean-Paul Sartre (1943 Sartre ( /1958 ) is that holism is required for understanding meaning, human nature, the consequences of choices that have been made, and the intersubjective positions held with respect to self
and others. Whilst hermeneutics is not specifically mentioned by Sartre, it is very clear that the important project is attending to conscious meaning. Sartre backed the guiding idea that the conscious needs to be followed as a clue in order to reveal the preconscious. This interpretative strategy is useful in making sense of psychological situations, for instance. Sartre realised that being, having and doing co-occur for human beings (p. 576). He concluded that holism must occur in making sense of the human situation. He argued that human existence is a whole, not just a series of parts, and that the parts indicate the whole to which they belong: "man is a totality and not a collection. Consequently he expresses himself as a whole in even his most insignificant and his most superficial behaviour. In other words, there is a not a taste, a mannerism, or a human act that is not revealing" (p. 568). Pre-conscious meanings can be interpreted by going from the conscious towards that which is currently out of consciousness, but the object of attention can be retrieved through discussion. He called his method existential psychoanalysis: "Its point of departure is experience; its pillar of support is the fundamental, pre-ontological comprehension which man has of the human person ... each human individual nevertheless possesses a priori the meaning of the revelatory value of these manifestations and is capable of deciphering them ... . Its method is comparative" (pp. 568-9). These comments have wide-ranging implications in terms of defining what is achievable in human inquiry. It is claimed that Sartre did justice to the complex and constructed nature of ordinary living.
Simone de Beauvoir was another who was exemplary in taking phenomenology and applying it to human development, gender relations and sexuality, for instance (1949a, 1949b) . She accepted Jean-Paul Sartre's holism and applied a contextual view of the intentionality of action to everyday life. For her, actions make sense in their context and aim overall. The same action thus needs to be understood through grasping the attitude and purpose of the specific actor. Such an approach is useful in taking theory to the individual, in understanding what happens for him or her, in any given situation. So it is a prerequisite for understanding personality and how specific events make sense to others. This holism is common to Sartre and Karl Jaspers as well.
Some Implications for the Human Sciences
To return to the original aim of the paper, it should now be clearer how important it is to be self-reflexive in making clear to colleagues and ourselves our own personal responsibility in how we make sense of situations. This is the concern that creates anxiety about re-search methods and the desire for adequate justification in various forms of meaning-oriented searching again. Another common aspect between three of the key thinkers mentioned above is now appraised, and that is the role of empathy in donating sense to what appears. What is common to Husserl and Jaspers is immersing oneself in the descriptions of the experiences of others, in order to grasp something like what their first-hand experience might be , cited in Marbach, 1982 . Jaspers also urged psychiatrists to focus on the conscious experiences of their clients (1913/1963, p. 27) , stating that the means of doing so is "the empathic listening to others in which we simultaneously keep touch with ourselves" (p. 21). He further insisted that "we shall keep the expression 'understanding' (Verstehen) solely for the
understanding of psychic events 'from within'. The expression will never be used for the appreciation of objective causal connections, which we have said can only be seen 'from without'" (p. 28 (Kern, 1997) .
Concluding Discussion
Although the biopsychosocial approach is laudable, it remains to be seen precisely how nature and nurture can be made into a unified whole, given that the two disciplines come from radically different ontological bases. There is a major tension between a focus on the biological basis for behaviour as opposed to the open exploration of meaningful qualitative experiences. Hermeneutic phenomenology concerns itself with the fundamentals for a qualitative approach to theory and practice. Its strength is that it is ready to account for variability in the senses of the same object. It can work with complex experiences because its holism can identify the contributory parts of experience as intentionality, sense, object and context. What phenomenology shows is that some phenomena are invisible to the natural science approach and fall outside of its remit.
In working towards a concordant biopsychosocial view, a hermeneutic applied psychology could support the understanding of human being as comprised of biological, psychological and social aspects, in which a great many contexts of parts and wholes could be identified (Kern, 1986) . The type of causality at play for human beings is multi-factorial, comprising both nature and nurture. Natural cause is irreversible biological cause in genetic tendencies to have a specific sort of personality and specific sorts of psychological problem (Livesley, 2003, pp. 69-73) . Psychological problems may also arise as a consequence of material damage to the brain or the physical structure of the body and its physiological ability to deal with stress, for instance. In the world of nurture, there are the meaningful events of smaller and wider spheres. Thus there is the world of personal choice and action, the world of the family of attachment figures within the cultural world of persons who are known, within the wider worlds of persons who may not be known but who are still influential. And, finally, there is the widest world possible of society and international influences on the individual life and history. It is a future project to unite the more meaning-oriented and empirical phenomenological approaches to the more natural scientific ones.
Even now only a small proportion of the original writings of Edmund Husserl are available to the public, and their translation into English has delayed the grasping of their full intent and perspective. The mature worldview of Husserl would now be called "social construction", but Husserl himself created the term "generative phenomenology" to refer to the accrual of meaning across the development of human civilisation (Steinbock, 1995) . Husserl took a holistic view of the development of the lifeworld. He focused on social history as the scope for the creation and maintenance of meaning. In overview: cultural worlds create themselves across history. This means that coconstruction occurs through people who know each other face to face, and it obeys identifiable laws, societal preferences and traditions of various sorts. The term "world" in phenomenology means a worldhorizon that contains within it a set of persons with their meaningful cultural objects of various kinds, such as music, food, ideas, social roles, and emotional responses with respect to the excitements and disappointments found there. Poetry, drama and film depict the worldviews of others in ways comparable to listening to someone speak about his or her life. Not much needs to be said before empathy fills in the gaps and makes sense of what is auditorially presented to consciousness.
However, what intentionality means is that concepts and experiences refer to the work done by consciousness in making meaning. It is a major task of Husserl's phenomenology to grasp this ability. A large portion of psychological life concerns psychological understanding about the intentions and feelings of others. But the region of natural cause does not properly appear in human behaviour and experience and is hard to identify. Contrary to Husserl, when hermeneutics is accepted there are no absolute starting points, no privileged starting points, and no possibility of self-validation by appeal to some best evidence outside of the hermeneutic circle. For the mature Husserl, "History is the great fact of absolute Being; and the ultimate questions, the ultimate metaphysical and teleological questions, are one with the questions regarding the absolute meaning of history" , p. 506, cited in Bernet, Kern & Marbach, 1993 . Consequently, the totality of cultural objects signifies human nature and its consciousness. The works produced indicate the intentions and nature of their makers.
This paper has argued that the tradition of phenomenology centres on interpreting lived experiences in various ways. The original Husserlian project is the mental clarification of the intentionalities in relation to their objects in preparation for new empirical psychological and sociological approaches that would meet their objects properly. But to ignore the ways that previous understanding creates influences will not make them go away. On the contrary, when it is accepted that the expectations of the future in the present are formed on the basis of the influence of the past -then one's own bias can begin to be grasped. In order to distinguish one's own conclusions, it is necessary to ensure that they concern the current topic and not past ones. To have clarity about one's own stance should minimise the confusion of mistaking one's own perspective for the one and only reading of a situation. Thus hermeneutics is part of reasoning about various realms of evidence.
Academics and the general population have widely differing understandings about human nature and what motivates human action. Despite what is ordinarily passed on as "folk psychology", understanding human situations accurately is demanded by life itself. Inevitably, the complex totality of human being exceeds the attempt to grasp it with complete certainty. Understanding must accept its imprecision.
